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THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE EXPANDED:
HARSHER SENTENCES ON RETRIAL PROHIBITED IN
BIFURCATED CAPITAL OFFENSE HEARINGS-
BULLINGTON V. MISSOURI
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no
person shall undergo the risk of punishment more than once for the same
offense.' This principle, referred to as the double jeopardy clause, bars
retrial for the same offense after acquittal,2 retrial for the same offense
after conviction,3 and multiple punishment for the same offense.4 The
underlying policy of the double jeopardy clause is to prevent the state from
continually harassing the accused.'
I. The double jeopardy clause provides: "nor shall any person be subject for the same of-
fense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Initially, the double jeopardy clause only provided protection in federal matters. In Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), the Court refused to extend the double jeopardy prohibition
to protect defendants in state criminal proceedings. The Court reasoned that protection from
double jeopardy was not a fundamental right and, consequently, could not be incorporated
into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In 1969, however, in Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the Court extended this protection to state criminal pro-
ceedings via the fourteenth amendment. For a general discussion of the double jeopardy
clause, see H. WAY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 237 (1980) therein-
after cited as WAY]; C. WHITEBREAD, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 23 (1978 & Supp.
1981). A more detailed analysis of the history of double jeopardy law appears in Sigler, A
History of Double Jeopardy, Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 283 (1963).
2. See, e.g., Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (per curiam) (retrial barred
following final judgment of acquittal regardless of erroneous ruling); United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662 (1896) (retrial barred following acquittal based on faulty indictment). Cf. Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) (retrial unfair if final judgment confirms innocence of accus-
ed); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) (conviction of lesser included offense implies
acquittal of greater offense, thus precluding retrial).
3. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (double jeopardy clause pro-
hibits second prosecution for same offense following an acquittal or conviction); Nunley v.
United States, 339 F.2d 442, 443 (10th Cir. 1967) (judgment of' conviction bars further pro-
secution on charge that was or could have been included in the indictment).-
4. See, e.g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873) (defendant sentenced to pay
fine and serve prison term under statute that required only one sanction or the other did not
have to serve prison term after paying fine); United States v. Sacco, 367 F.2d 368 (2d Cir.
1966) (judge not permitted to increase sentence once defendant had begun serving the sentence
originally imposed); United States v. Adams, 362 F.2d 210 (6th Cir. 1966) (judge precluded
from increasing sentence from one year to ten years on first count in order to maintain full
sentence term of defendant when statute required reduction of sentence on second count from
ten years to one year).
5. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (to allow the government repeated
attempts to convict a defendant would violate constitutional procedural protections established
for criminal trials); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (state should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict defendants thereby subjecting them to embar-
rassment and increasing likelihood of finding them guilty).
One author has distinguished four separate policy considerations underlying the principle of
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The ban on double jeopardy, however, is not absolute.6 One exception
arises when a defendant, after a conviction and sentence, successfully attacks
the adverse finding of the trial court and obtains a new trial.' In this situation,
the United States Supreme Court has held that the accused may be retried8
double jeopardy. First, the theory that guilt must be established by proving the elements of the
alleged offense to a single jury. This theory is based upon the belief that the state should not
be permitted to capitalize on the increased probability of conviction by arguing before several
juries. Second, the prosecution should not be able to seek a harsher sentence by bringing the
case before more than one judge. Third, double jeopardy protection prevents criminal proceed-
ings from becoming a tool for unwarranted harassment of the accused by the state. Finally,
multiple punishment for a single offense at the same trial is prohibited due to the perception
that judges should not impose more than one punishment for a legislatively defined offense.
Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 266-67 (1965).
6. See Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 50 (1973) (although there is no absolute bar to a
harsher sentence, such a penalty may not be based on judicial vindictiveness); North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969) (neither the double jeopardy clause nor the equal protec-
tion clause absolutely bars a more severe sentence upon reconviction).
7. The attack may be a direct attack, such as an appeal, or a collateral attack, such as a
motion for a new trial. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973) (harsher
sentence imposed on retrial following successful appeal by defendant); Robinson v. United
States, 144 F.2d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 1944) (death sentence upheld following nullification of prior
life imprisonment sentence on defendant's application for habeas corpus), aff'd on other
grounds, 324 U.S. 282 (1945).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) (retrial permitted after successful
appeal because retrial protects societal interest in trying those accused of crime); United States
v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964) (retrial after reversal for trial error is necessary to protect
societal interest in punishing the guilty); Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960) (retrial
permitted following reversal of conviction); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) (retrial
permitted after conviction set aside).
Courts frequently have relied on the "waiver theory" to dismiss double jeopardy claims.
Under this theory, the defendant who voluntarily attacked the decision of the trial court, waiv-
ed his right to assert the protections of double jeopardy. See Brewster v. Swope, 180 F.2d 984,
986 (9th Cir. 1950) (dictum) (retrial permissible where defendant waives protection of doublejeopardy through a motion for retrial or on appeal); State v. McCord, 8 Kan. 161, 168 (1871)
(by appealing or moving for new trial, defendant waived a right neither courts nor legislature
can take away); Cross v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 62, 63, 77 S.E.2d 447, 448 (1953) (defen-
dant's appeal and motion for a new trial waived double jeopardy defense); Smith v. State, 196
Wis. 102, 103, 219 N.W. 270, 271 (1928) (retrial properly ordered because defendant moved
for new trial and, therefore, waived plea of double jeopardy. But see Kepner v. United States,
195 U.S. 100, 134-37 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (waiver theory rejected); Mayers & Yar-
brough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L. REV 1, 6-7 (1960)
(waiver theory erroneously assumes a voluntary act, however, defendant may prefer a reversal
of conviction rather than a new trial) [hereinafter cited as Mayers & Yarbrough].
Double jeopardy claims also were dismissed and retrials granted under a second
theory-"continuous jeopardy". This theory provided that jeopardy continued until a final,
errorless decision was rendered. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134-37 (1904)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (jeopardy continued until final disposition of case regardless of
number of times defendant is tried); State v. Aus, 105 Mont. 82, 69 P.2d 584 (1937) (defen-
dant not placed in new jeopardy but in same jeopardy when new trial granted); Mayers &
Yarbrough, supra at 7-8 (if double jeopardy protects against successive prosecutions for same
conduct, theory that jeopardy continues until final settlement of same prosecution best explains
allowing retrial). The United States Supreme Court, in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184,
191-93 (1957), however, expressly rejected both the "waiver" and the "continuous jeopardy"
theories.
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and, if convicted again, may be subject to a harsher sentence than originally
was imposed.'
In 1981, the Supreme Court greatly restricted this exception to the double
jeopardy clause in Bullington v. Missouri."0 In Bullington, the Court con-
sidered the issue of whether the double jeopardy clause prohibits the im-
position of a harsher sentence on retrial in the context of the bifurcated
proceeding" when that harsher sentence may be capital punishment. A five
justice majority held that if the original jury in a bifurcated proceeding im-
poses a sentence of life imprisonment, the double jeopardy clause prohibits
the state from seeking the death penalty upon retrial.' 2
In prohibiting the imposition of capital punishment on retrial in a bifur-
cated proceeding, the Bullington Court departed from the double jeopardy
exception. To understand this departure, an examination of the distinctions
between single hearings and bifurcated proceedings 3 is essential. By pro-
viding double jeopardy protection to the defendant at resentencing, the
Court overlooked the fact that the Missouri capital murder statute already
provided adequate protection to the accused.' 4 The Bullington decision will
result in nonuniform double jeopardy treatment based on irrelevant pro-
cedural distinctions rather than on the underlying policy of the double
jeopardy clause.' Consequently, this decision will infringe upon the states'
interests in punishing criminals.' 6
HARSHER SENTENCING ON RETRIAL
Single Hearing Trials
Traditionally, the single hearing trial has been utilized to try defendants
accused of capital offenses.'" Under this procedure, the guilt or innocence
9. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973) (following reversal of conviction
and prior sentence of 15 years imprisonment the Court affirmed sentence of life imprisonment
for robbery conviction); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919) (upholding death sentence
on retrial where sentence in original trial was life imprisonment); Gully v. Kunzman, 592 F.2d
283 (6th Cir.) (permitting prosecution to seek death penalty on retrial in a bifurcated hearing
following reversal of conviction and prior sentence of life imprisonment), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 924 (1979); United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170 (4th Cir. 1976) (defendant may face
harsher sentence on retrial provided there is little possibility of vindictiveness or retaliation by
judge or prosecution); Martinex v. Estelle, 527 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding life im-
prisonment sentence where defendant had received 15 yeai sentence in prior trial after waiving
jury trial as part of plea bargain); Arechiga v. Texas, 469 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1972) (upholding
sentence of life imprisonment for possession of narcotics, following reversal of conviction with
sentence of two to 15 years imprisonment), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 932 (1974).
10. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
II. See infra notes 33-52 and accompanying text.
12. 451 U.S. at 446.
13. See infra notes 17-52 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
17. One common objection to single hearing trials is that sentencing juries in capital of-
fense cases do not receive enough evidence on the issue of guilt to render an informed decision
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of the accused is determined, and upon a finding of guilty, a sentence is im-
posed.e If this initial conviction was reversed but the defendant was con-
victed upon retrial, an issue arose as to whether the imposition of a harsher
sentence than that imposed in the original trial violated the double jeopardy
clause. The Supreme Court first confronted this issue in Stroud v. United
States. 9 In Stroud, the Supreme Court held that a defendant who suc-
cessfully attacked a prior conviction and sentence of life imprisonment
could be sentenced to death if reconvicted of first degree murder.2"
The Supreme Court subsequently limited the Stroud rule. In North
Carolina v. Pearce," the Court held that when a judge was the sentencing
authority, a harsher sentence could be imposed on retrial only when the
judge set forth his reasons for so doing.22 The Pearce Court recognized the
possibility that a defendant could be exposed to prosecutorial or judicial
vindictiveness for having successfully obtained a reversal of the
regarding the death sentence. Before a judge imposes a sentence, he is given a presentence
report containing information pertinent to a determination of the sanction. If a judge cannot
make an informed decision without additional information, it is argued that a jury, comprised
of people less experienced in penology than a judge, cannot make a reasonable decision
without such information. Note, The Bifurcated Trial Procedure and First Degree Murder, 3
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 628, 628-31 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bifurcated Trial]. See Note, Bifur-
cating Florida's Capital Trials: Two Steps are Better than One, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 127, 133-35
(1971) (major problem with Florida's single hearing trial procedure is that both defendant and
state are precluded from introducing evidence that would enable jury to make informed deci-
sion regarding sentence) [hereinafter cited as Two Steps].
18. In the majority of states that retain the death sentence, the jury is the sentencing
authority. Two Steps, supra note 17, at 128.
19. 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
20. Id. at 18. The facts in Stroud were unique. The defendant, charged with killing a
prison guard, obtained reversal of his first degree murder conviction which imposed the death
sentence. On retrial, he was again convicted but the jury did not recommend the death penalty.
After another successful appeal, the defendant was found guilty of first degree murder. In the
second retrial the jury imposed the death sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the death
sentence. Id.
21. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
22. Id. at 726. Moreover, the Court asserted that the judge's reasons must be based on ob-
jective information concerning the defendant's conduct after the original sentencing. Id.
Specifically, the reasons had to be founded upon events throwing "new light upon the defen-
dant's 'life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities.'" Id. at 723 (quoting
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949)). The justification for this requirement was
that punishment should fit the person rather than the crime. 395 U.S. at 723 (1969).
Justice Douglas, concurring in Pearce, argued that the majority's position would permit a
criminal defendant's conduct, subsequent to his first trial, to justify an increase of his
sentence. Justice Douglas, however, reasoned that the state is not allowed to reopen every ver-
dict and readjust every sentence. To permit a harsher sentence based on conduct subsequent to
a conviction would be to hold a defendant criminally liable for that conduct when he has
not been tried. Furthermore, the state should not be permitted to do so simply because the
defendant has appealed a conviction. Id. at 736 & n. 6 (Douglas, J., concurring). But see Com-
ment, Harsher Sentence on Retrial, 38 TENN. L. REV. 562, 568-69 (1971) (subsequent conduct
should be considered because defendant initiated the reopening of his case and the state has
remedies against subsequent wrongdoers who do not reopen their cases such as loss of the chance
for early parole) [hereinafter cited as Harsher Sentence].
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conviction.23 Thus, the Court required that the reasons for the imposition
of the harsher sentence appear on the record. This requirement afforded an
appellate court the opportunity to review the constitutional legitimacy of
the harsher sentence. 24
Despite the imposition of restrictions on judicial resentencing, the Pearce
Court reaffirmed the principle that the Constitution does not raise an ab-
solute bar to the issuance of a more severe sentence after a successful appeal
of a conviction.25 The Court declared that when the original conviction is set
aside at the defendant's request and a new trial ordered, the original pro-
ceedings are nullified and the trial process begins anew. 26 Thus, although the
Pearce decision substantially curtailed judicial freedom to impose a harsher
penalty on retrial, the Court did not abrogate that power.2 ,
In Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 28 the Court refused to extend the Pearce
restrictions on judicial resentencing to a jury. 29 Unlike the situation in
which a judge is the sentencing authority, vindictiveness is not a concern
when a jury imposes the sentence because, in most cases, the second jury
has no knowledge of the prior sentence.3" The Court also rejected the argu-
23. 395 U.S. at 723-24. The possibility of vindictiveness might make defendants fearful and
thus deter them from exercising their right to appeal an adverse decision. Id. Cf. Midgett v.
McClelland, 547 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1977) (harsher sentence disallowed due to retaliatory ap-
pearance of sentence); Sommerville v. State, 521 S.W.2d 792 (Tenn. 1975) (harsher sentence
impermissible because nine jurors, having read newspaper article that had erroneously reported
defendant's initial sentence, were tainted with vindictiveness). See infra notes 113-14 and ac-
companying text.
24. 395 U.S. at 723-24. See also Harsher Sentence, supra note 22, at 568 (if the judge
justifies the increased punishment, a defendant cannot complain of unfair treatment because
the sentence would not be constitutionally barred).
25. 395 U.S. at 721.
26. Id. at 720-21. This is referred to as the "clean slate" doctrine and permits not only a
new trial, but also a possible harsher sentence. Id. at 720.
27. For a discussion of Pearce and its ramifications, see generally Harsher Sentence, supra
note 22.
28. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
29. Id. at 23-24. The defendant in Chaffin had been convicted of robbery by open force, a
capital offense in Georgia, and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. He obtained a reversal
of the conviction on appeal, and subsequently was retried before a different judge and jury.
He was found guilty on retrial and sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 18-20. In affirming
the harsher sentence, the Court rejected the defendant's double jeopardy argument and refused
to overrule Stroud. Id. at 23-24.
30. Id. at 26. One reason for possible judicial vindictiveness was that the judge was likely
to be prejudiced by his knowledge that the defendant had already been convicted of the of-
fense for which he was again on trial. Accordingly, Justice Powell stated that "[the first
prerequisite for the imposition of a retaliatory penalty is knowledge of the prior sentence." Id.
The Court articulated two other distinctions between judge and jury sentencing which
justified disparate treatment. First, the jury has no personal stake in the prior conviction. The
jury is without motivation for self-vindication. On the other hand, the judge in the second trial
may be the same judge whose prior handling of the case was deemed unacceptable by an ap-
pellate court and, thus, he may seek self-vindication. Second, unlike a jury, the judge may be
sensitive to administrative concerns which dictate the discouragement of what some may con-
sider unwarranted appeals. Id. at 27.
Justice Stewart, in his dissent, argued that jury trials were not free of vindictiveness. He
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ment that fear of receiving a harsher sentence on retrial will unconstitu-
tionally chill a defendant's right to appeal.3" Thus, while Pearce imposed
limitations on harsher resentencing by a judge, the Court in Chaffin
granted a jury, in a unitary trial context, unrestrained freedom to impose a
harsher sentence on retrial.32
Analysis of the double jeopardy clause, therefore, reveals no absolute
prohibition to the imposition of a more severe sentence on retrial subse-
quent to a defendant's successful attack of his conviction. While the
Supreme Court has attached certain qualifications to this general rule, it has
consistently refused to overrule it in the context of a unitary trial pro-
ceeding.
The Bifurcated Approach
The bifurcated proceeding was popularized in legislative response to the
maintained that possible vindictiveness existed on the part of the prosecution and trial judge.
As such, a judge may instruct the jury in a manner calculated to sway the decision, or a pro-
secutor may ask for a sentence more severe than the original to punish the defendant for ap-
pealing. Id. at 35-36 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart, however, conceded that the jury
should not be precluded from imposing a harsher sentence. He suggested that a judge be re-
quired to reduce any sentence on retrial to that imposed by the jury in the original trial, unless
he could set forth reasons for the harsher sentence as required by Pearce. Id. at 37. Moreover,
this procedure would not forfeit the benefits of jury sentencing because at most, the verdict of
the original jury would be given effect. Id.
31. The Court noted that the criminal law is replete with situations that require a defendant
to make difficult choices. One example cited by the Court was decisions involved in "plea
bargaining." Id. at 32. In addition, the Court recognized the legitimacy of the jury sentencing
process and maintained that an incidental consequence of that process was the requirement
that a defendant choose between waiving his constitutional right to a jury trial and facing a
potentially harsher sentence. Id. at 32-33. Finally, Justice Powell expressed doubt that the fear
of a harsher sentence would influence a defendant in his decision to appeal because at the time
this decision was made, the possibility of receiving a harsher sentence was too speculative and
remote. Id. at 33-35.
32. Justice Marshall filed a strong dissent in Chaffin, in which he raised two arguments.
First, he contended that Pearce-like restrictions imposed on juries would not significantly in-
fringe a state's interest in permitting juries to impose harsher sentences on retrial. Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. at 38-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He noted that the jury's duty in
sentencing-to fit a punishment to the crime-was impaired by limiting the sentence imposed
on retrial. This function was not substantially impaired, however, because one jury would
already have determined a sentence. Id. at 42-43. Justice Marshall also argued that because
judges are limited in imposing harsher sentences on retrial while juries are not, the defendant's
right to a jury trial is burdened. Id. at 44-46. He reasoned that a defendant will readily waive
his right to a jury trial on retrial if he is cognizant that a judge will be limited in imposing a
harsher sentence, but a jury will not. Following United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968),
placing such a burden on a constitutional right was impermissible if it was unnecessary to ac-
complish some legitimate state interest. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. at 44 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Because Pearce restrictions could be imposed on sentencing juries, according to
Justice Marshall, without significantly infringing upon any state interest, the burden on an in-
dividual's sixth amendment right to a jury trial was unnecessary to the state interest and,
therefore, was unconstitutional. Id. at 46. See also Harsher Sentence, supra note 22, at 572 (to
distinguish between jury and judge imposed sentence overlooks the major concern of Pearce,
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Supreme Court decision of Furman v. Georgia.33 The Furman Court held
that total discretion in the imposition of the death sentence constituted cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments.3 ' As a result, death penalty legislation was instituted to provide
various procedural safeguards to control the discretion of the decision-
maker." One such safeguard, the bifurcated trial, "6 requires two separate
hearings.3 The first hearing addresses the issue of whether the accused is
which was to prevent defendant's right to appeal from being "chilled" by fear of unjustified
harsher sentence).
33. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
34. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas argued that statutes permitting
discretionary imposition of the death sentence violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment and the "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibition of the eighth amend-
ment. Id. He noted the tension between the holdings of Furman and McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971), vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972), which held, in part, that the Constitu-
tion did not prohibit a state from granting absolute discretion to sentencing juries in determin-
ing whether to impose the death sentence. In analyzing the different holdings, Justice Douglas
stressed that discretionary capital sentencing procedures permit arbitrary and random imposi-
tion of the death penalty. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 248 n.11 (1972) (per curiam)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
35. Note, Capital Punishment Statutes After Furman, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 651 (1974). The
author discusses the various types of capital punishment statutes enacted after Furman. These
statutes are divided into three categories: (1) statutes conferring mandatory death sentences; (2)
statutes limiting the discretion of the judge or jury; and (3) statutes limiting the exercise of
discretion by prescribing specific aggravating circumstances upon which a death sentence must
be based. Id. at 670-84. The post-Furman statutes, however, have not effectively abrogated the
discretion of sentencing authorities and, therefore, violate the spirit of Furman. Id. at 684-85.
Cf. Comment, Capital Sentencing-Effect of McGautha and Furman, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 619, 626
(1972) (legislatures seeking to retain capital punishment will have to either retain present
specification of capital crimes and generate standards to guide penalty decision or make death
sentence mandatory for certain offenses). See also The Aftermath of Furman: The Florida Ex-
perience, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 2 (1973) (analysis of competing policy and legal con-
siderations of Furman with regard to the constitutionality of the post-Furman Florida capital
punishment statute).
36. The bifurcated trial, a means for preserving the constitutional rights of a defendant, ex-
isted prior to Furman. Its popularity among those states retaining death penalty statutes,
however, has greatly increased in the wake of the Furman decision. For an analysis of pre-
Furman bifurcated trial statutes, see Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 50 (1964). See also Two Steps, supra note 17 (advocating use of bifurcated trials to
achieve fairer sentences by allowing jury to hear evidence regarding sentencing that would be
inadmissible at guilt phase). But see Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REV. 968,
997-1000 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Virginia] (presenting some problems with the bifurcated
approach).
37. Commentators emphasize two basic advantages in the use of bifurcated proceedings.
First, this procedure allows for the introduction of all evidence essential to an informed deter-
mination of a sentence. Traditional rules of evidence preclude the introduction at a trial on
guilt of much of the evidence a sentencing authority might find relevant. In a bifurcated trial,
such evidence commonly is admissible at the presentence hearing. Bifurcated Trial, supra note
17, at 631.
Second, the sentencing evidence in a bifurcated trial is admitted without prejudicing the jury
on the issue of guilt because this evidence is not admissible until a verdict of guilty has been
rendered. Conversely, the possibility of prejudice exists in the unitary procedure because the
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innocent or guilty. 8 If the defendant is adjudged guilty, a second, or
presentence, hearing is held. In this presentence hearing, the sentencing
authority,39 usually the same judge or jury that found the accused guilty,
hears evidence relevant to the possible sentences that can be imposed"0 and
determines the appropriate sentence based on that evidence.
The Missouri capital murder statute involved in Bullington is a typical bi-
furcated trial statute. 4 Pursuant to this statute, the jury is given the choice
between two sentences: death; or life imprisonment without parole or pro-
bation for fifty years.42 To aid the jury in its determination, counsel must
present evidence of statutorily prescribed aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances.4 3 The jury is instructed that for the death sentence to be impos-
ed, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least
one of the aggravating circumstances.44 Further, these aggravating factors
must be sufficient, in the jury's estimation, to warrant the death sentence.45
The jury is also instructed that it is not compelled to impose the death
sentence.4" That is, the defendant can be sentenced to life imprisonment,
even if the jury finds that the state has proven the aggravating circum-
stances beyond a reasonable doubt and that such circumstances outweigh all
of the mitigating factors.4 ' Finally, the jury's decision to impose the death
sentence must be unanimous or life imprisonment will be imposed. 8 In ad-
defendant introduces mitigating evidence before the jury deliberates on the issue of guilt. Id.
See also Two Steps, supra note 17, at 136 (urging adoption of the bifurcated procedure in
Florida capital trials primarily because of evidentiary benefits).
38. In the first phase of the bifurcated proceeding, guilt is determined in the same manner
as it is in the unitary trial procedure. Two Steps, supra note 17, at 136.
39. The majority of states that retain capital punishment statutes permit jury sentencing in
capital cases. This may be due, in part, to popular sentiment that the decision to impose the
death penalty should reflect the judgment of a cross section of the community. Virginia, supra
note 36, at 969.
40. Rules of evidence regarding admissibility are usually liberal in the presentence hearing.
See Two Steps, supra note 17, at 137. Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (bifur-
cated proceeding is the best method for obviating arbitrariness in death sentencing because
sentencing authority is presented with evidence relevant to imposing death penalty).
41. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.006.2 (1979).
42. Id. § 565.008.1.
43. Id. § 565.006.2. Under the Missouri statute, the evidence presented is subject to the
rules of evidence and may include the record of any prior criminal convictions, pleas of guilty,
pleas of nolo contendere, or the absence of such convictions or pleas. In addition, the prosecu-
tion may introduce evidence in aggravation only if such evidence was made known to the
defendant before trial. Id.
44. Id. § 565.012.5 (1979 & Supp. 1980). The statute specifies 12 aggravating circum-
stances, id. § 565.012.2, and seven mitigating circumstances, id. § 565.012.3.
45. Id. § 565.012.1(4).
46. See 451 U.S. at 435. See also State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908, 913
(Mo. 1980) (final decision rests with jury because jury's predilections as to mercy are part of
the statutory safeguards), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S.
430 (1981).
47. 451 U.S. at 434.
48. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.006.2 (1979) (judge may never impose death sentence when jury
does not agree, but rather is to impose life imprisonment).
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dition, the statute compels the jury to designate in writing the aggravating
circumstances it found to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 By doing
so, the reasons for a death sentence recommendation are made available for
review by the state supreme court."0 Missouri's Supreme Court then has the
authority to affirm the death sentence5' or remand the case for resentenc-
ing.5 2
Thus, the bifurcated trial is procedurally different than the single hearing
trial. Although the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the single
hearing procedure allows harsher sentencing on retrial, until Bullington v.
Missouri, it has not determined whether harsher sentences could be imposed
in a bifurcated proceeding. Specifically, Bullington presented the Court with
the question of whether to follow the single hearing approach to resentencing
in a bifurcated proceeding.
THE BULLINGTON DECISION
Facts and Procedural History
In September of 1977, an intruder, armed with a shotgun, broke into the
home of Pamela Sue Wright." Directing Pamela's mother and brother to
lie on the kitchen floor, the intruder blindfolded them, bound their hands
and feet, and abducted Pamela.5" Several days later, Pamela's body was
found floating in a creek several miles from her house."
Robert Bullington was indicted in St. Louis County, Missouri and charged
with capital murder of Pamela Wright.5 6 Pursuant to Missouri law, the pro-
secution advised Bullington's counsel that the state intended to seek the
death penalty if Bullington was convicted. The prosecution alleged that
49. Id. § 565.012.4.
50. This provision requires the Missouri Supreme Court to determine the constitutionality
of any death sentence by reviewing the record of the bifurcated proceeding. Id. § 565.014.1.
51. Id. § 565.014.5(1).
52. Id. § 565.014.5(2). In reviewing the sentence, the state supreme court determines the
validity of the sentence. That is, the court determines whether the sentence was imposed on the
basis of some arbitrary factor such as passion or prejudice, id. § 565.014.3(1), whether the
evidence supports the finding of the aggravating circumstances, id. § 565.014.3(2), and whether
imposition of the death penalty is excessive compared to penalties imposed in similar cases. Id.
§ 565.014.3(3).
53. Brief for Respondent at 1-2, Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
54. Id. at 2.
55. Id. at 4. The body was clad only in jeans; her blouse, shoes, and socks had been
removed. Decomposition had progressed to the point that no determination could be made
regarding sexual assault. Id.
Several teenagers had reported to police that they had seen a truck similar to that driven by
Bullington near Pamela's home the evening of the abduction. Police searched Bullington's
truck and found a blonde hair, believed to have belonged to Pamela. Id. at 2. Based on this
and other incriminating evidence, Bullington was arrested in California in October of 1977 and
was returned to Missouri. Id. at 4.
56. 451 U.S. at 435 & n.7. The Circuit Court of St. Louis County granted Bullington's mo-
tion for a change of venue to Jackson County, Missouri. Id. at 435.
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Bullington had a history of serious criminal convictions for assault" and
that his offense in this case was outrageous and involved torture and mental
depravity." The jury returned a verdict of guilty." The following day the
sentencing stage of the bifurcated trial commenced.6 1
After hearing the evidence and arguments, the jury rendered a sentence
of life imprisonment.6 ' Bullington, however, successfully moved for a new
trial based on Duren v. Missouri,6 ' a United States Supreme Court decision
which recently had held Missouri's jury selection procedure unconstitu-
tional.6 3 Before commencement of the retrial, the state notified Bullington
of its intention to again seek the death penalty . 6  Bullington moved to strike
the state's notice arguing that relitigation of the aggravating circumstances
alleged in the original trial would violate the double jeopardy clause and
chill his right to appeal.6 In the alternative, Bullington contended that any
death sentence determination should be subject to the sentencing restrictions
enunciated in Pearce.6
The trial court notified the parties that it intended to sustain the defendant's
motion. Consequently, the prosecution sought a writ of prohibition6 1 to pre-
vent such a ruling. 8 The appellate court rejected the prosecution's request.69
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued the writ, holding
that the possibility of a harsher sentence being imposed on retrial did not chill
the defendant's right to appeal.' 0 The court further ruled that the Pearce
sentencing restrictions imposed on judges were inapplicable to juries." Bull-
ington petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court on the
ground that the state supreme court's decision was inconsistent with the dou-
57. Id.
58. Id. The state alleged 2 of the 12 statutorily prescribed aggravating circumstances. Mo.
REV. STAT. § 565.012.2 (1979 & Supp. 1980).
59. 451 U.S. at 435.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 436. Bullington moved for a judgment of acquittal and, in the alternative, for a
new trial. The court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal. Id.
62. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
63. Id. at 370. Missouri's jury selection statute provided women with several opportunities
to refuse jury duty that were not granted to men. In Duren, the defendant claimed that these
practices violated his sixth amendment right to an impartial trial by a fair cross section of his
community. Id. at 360. The Supreme Court sustained Duren's claim. Id. at 370.
64. 451 U.S. at 436. In the retrial, the state relied on the same two aggravating cir-
cumstances alleged in the first trial. Id. See supra note 58.
65. 451 U.S. at 436.
66. Id. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
67. Prohibition is a remedy whereby a superior judicial authority prevents an inferior
judicial authority from exceeding its jurisdiction. A writ of prohibition is often sought when all
other remedies fail to offer adequate relief. Note, The Writ of Prohibition in Missouri, 1972
WASH. U.L.Q. 511, 530.
68. 451 U.S. at 436.
69. Id.
70. State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908, 915 (Mo. 1980). See infra notes
113-16 and accompanying text.
71. State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908, 913-14 (Mo. 1980).
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ble jeopardy clause. The United States Supreme Court subsequently reversed
and remanded the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court. 2
The Majority's Rationale
In Bullington, the Court was faced with a recent development in the law
of criminal procedure, the bifurcated trial. Justice Blackmun, writing for
the majority, recognized fundamental procedural differences between the
bifurcated proceeding and the traditional single hearing trial. Consequently,
the Court ruled that existing precedent, all of which involved traditional
single hearing proceedings, was inapplicable to an analysis of the bifurcated
trial. 3
In particular, the Court reasoned that the bifurcated proceeding in Bull-
ington did not afford the jury unlimited discretion in determining the ap-
propriate punishment for a capital offense.7" Once the jury found the
defendant guilty, a separate presentence hearing was required before the
same jury. In this proceeding, the prosecution was compelled to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of certain aggravating factors
before the death penalty could be imposed. Moreover, the Bullington Court
found that in a bifurcated proceeding the jury was given only a choice be-
tween two punishments rather than discretion to choose from a wide
range. 5
Although the bifurcated hearing presented the Court with a novel approach
to sentencing,7 6 it had addressed a similar type of sentencing procedure on a
previous occasion. In United States v. DiFrancesco,77 the Court considered a
presentence hearing provision under the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970." Under this provision, a court could not impose a harsher sentence
unless the government proved at a presentence hearing that the defendant
was a "danggous special offender." 7 9 The DiFrancesco Court held that the
double jeopardy clause prohibited neither government appeal of a sentence
under the "special offender" provision,"0 nor the increased sentence provided
for therein. 8'
72. 451 U.S. at 446-47.
73. Id. at 439.
74. Id. at 438.
75. Id. at 439. The Court stated that "the sentencing procedures considered in the Court's
previous cases did not have the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence." Id.
76. See supra note 36.
77. ,449 U.S. 117 (1980).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976).
79. Id.
80. 449 U.S. at 137.
81. Id. at 138-39. DiFrancesco had argued that by imposing a harsher sentence on him at
the appellate level, the special offender provision violated the double jeopardy guarantee
against multiple punishments. Id. at 138. The Court rejected this contention and held that
when Congress specifically provided 'for the appeal of a sentence by the prosecution, increased
sentencing pursuant to that appeal was not multiple punishment within the meaning of double
jeopardy prohibitions. Id. at 139.
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The Bullington Court distinguished the DiFrancesco decision on several
grounds. First, the Bullington majority reasoned that DiFrancesco involved
appellate review of the sentence rather than a new trial. 2 Second, the Court
noted that the statute in DiFrancesco granted more discretion to the senten-
cing judge than the Missouri statute gave to the sentencing jury."3 Finally,
the statute in DiFrancesco permitted an increased sentence if a
preponderance of the evidence proved that the defendant was a dangerous
special offender.84 In contrast, the statute in Bullington required proof of
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt before the death
penalty could be imposed." Based on these distinctions, the Court ruled
that DiFrancesco did not apply. 86
After distinguishing the application of existing case law, the Bullington
majority analyzed the underlying rationale of prior double jeopardy cases.
The Court acknowledged the Pearce "clean slate" doctrine, which nullifies
the original trial when a retrial occurs," but noted two major exceptions to
that doctrine in single hearing proceedings. First, in Burks v. United
States," the Court held that despite the general rule permitting retrial, the
defendant could not be retried if the conviction, on appeal, had been
reversed because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict
the accused." Second, in Green v. United States," the Court held that con-
viction of a lesser included offense was an implied acquittal of the greater
offense and thus, the double jeopardy clause barred retrial for the greater
offense.9
82. 451 U.S. at 440. The Court distinguished an appellate review from a de novo hearing.
In Bullington, which involved a de novo hearing, the prosecution had a second chance to prove
the case before a new fact finder. Appellate review, on the other hand, involves only findings
of law, not of fact. Id.
83. Id. While the jury in Bullington had a choice between life imprisonment and death, id.
at 440-41, the sentencing judge in DiFrancesco could sentence a dangerous special offender to
any prison term not in excess of 25 years or not disproportionately severe, in comparison, to
the maximum penalty ordinarily imposed for the felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976).
84. Id. at 441. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976).
85. 451 U.S. at 441. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
86. 451 U.S. at 440-41.
87. Id. at 442. For a discussion of the "clean slate" doctrine of Pearce, see supra note 26
and accompanying text.
88. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
89. Id. at 15-17. In ruling that there had been insufficient evidence to convict, the Burks
Court impliedly held that the defendant should have been acquitted as a matter of law.
Because double jeopardy law precluded retrial after acquittal, the defendant could not be
retried. Id. See 31 U. CHi. L. REV. 365 (1964) (supporting prohibition of retrial following
reversal based on insufficient evidence).
90. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
91. Id. at 189-91. The defendant in Green had been indicted for first-degree murder. The
jury, after being instructed that it could convict the defendant of either first or second-degree
murder, found him guilty of the latter. The defendant successfully appealed, but on retrial was
convicted of first-degree murder. The Supreme Court invalidated the second trial and held that
the prior conviction of second-degree murder was an implied acquittal of first-degree murder.
Id. Because retrial after acquittal was barred by the double jeopardy clause, the most severe
offense for which the defendant could thereafter be tried was second-degree murder. Id.
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Relying on these exceptions, the Bullington Court ruled that Missouri
could not seek the death penalty in the retrial proceeding against Bull-
ington.92 The imposition of the death sentence under Missouri's capital
sentencing procedure requires the prosecution to prove the existence of ag-
gravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on this statutory require-
ment, the Bullington Court, like the Court in Burks, reasoned that by
imposing a sentence of life imprisonment, the jury had determined that
there was insufficient evidence to impose the death penalty.93 In addition,
the majority followed Green and concluded that because the jury had been
given a choice between two possible sentences, the imposition of the lesser
sentence served as an implied acquittal of the greater."' As a result, the pro-
secution was barred from seeking the death penalty on retrial.9"
CRITICISM
Although the Bullington Court correctly recognized the necessity of
preserving a defendant's constitutional rights9 6 the decision represents a
reversal of the Court's position on the validity of imposing harsher
sentences on retrial. The underlying premise for granting double jeopardy
protection in Bulington was that the presentence hearing had the essential
characteristics of a trial on the issue of guilt. Because the double jeopardy
clause prohibited retrial after acquittal on the issue of guilt, the Bullington
Court reasoned that the imposition of a life sentence was an implied acquit-
92. 451 U.S. at 442-45.
93. Id. at 445.
94. Id. Contra United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 135 n.14 (1980) (Pearce and
Green are reconcilable on grounds that imposition of sentence does not operate as an implied
acquittal of any greater sentence).
95. 451 U.S. at 445. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Powell, and joined by Chief
Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Rehnquist, argued that the majority disregarded prece-
dent in applying the double jeopardy clause to sentencing. The dissent maintained that double
jeopardy prohibitions never have been applied to determinations of sentence with the same
force as they have been applied to determinations of guilt because of the essential difference
between the two. Id. at 447 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell reasoned that the under-
lying goal in the determination of guilt was to arrive at the truth, an objective standard which
could be right or wrong. The determination of an appropriate sentence, however, was discre-
tionary. Accordingly, one jury's sentence was no more right or wrong than another's, provided
that the sentence was within statutory limits. Justice Powell argued that the possibility of error
as to guilt or innocence was unacceptable because there were objective measures for testing the
correctness of such a decision. Because of the nature of the determination of sentence,
however, no such standard existed; therefore, the double jeopardy clause should be applied to
determinations of guilt but not of sentence. Id. at 450.
Additionally, Justice Powell noted that the imposition of life imprisonment by the jury did
not amount to an implied acquittal of the death sentence because the jury was not compelled
to impose the death penalty even if the prosecution proved aggravating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 452 n.4.
96. 451 U.S. at 445. The court relied on Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88
(1957), which held that the underlying concept of double jeopardy protection was to protect a
defendant from repeated attempts by the state to convict him.
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tal of the death penalty and precluded a harsher sentence on retrial." An
examination of the presentence hearing, however, reveals that the Court
erred in ruling that the jury's imposition of life imprisonment was an im-
plied acquittal of the death penalty.
First, Bullington's motion for a new trial was granted pursuant to the
Supreme Court's decision in Duren v. Missouri.9' According to the Duren
Court, Missouri's statutory provisions governing jury duty were unconstitu-
tional. 9 Bullington's jury, which had been chosen pursuant to these provi-
sions, therefore was invalid. The Bullington Court, however, permitted the
invalid jury's sentencing determination to serve as an implied acquittal of
the death sentence. This implied acquittal, reasoned the Court, precluded
the state from seeking a harsher sentence on retrial. Although the invalidity
of the jury required retrial as to guilt, the Court permitted the sentence im-
posed by that same invalid jury to preclude a retrial of the original
sentence. The Court failed to recognize, however, that just as an invalid
jury cannot render a valid conviction, neither can it render a valid
sentence.' 0 To avoid this anomaly, the Court should have rendered Bull-
ington's original sentence a nullity rather than interpreting it as an implied
acquittal of the death penalty.
Second, the Court misinterpreted the Missouri capital sentencing statute,
which provided for a bifurcated proceeding. The Court maintained that the
jury imposed the lesser of the two sentences because the prosecution had
failed to prove the elements necessary to impose the death penalty beyond a
reasonable doubt.'0 Relying on Burks and Green, the Court reasoned that
this was an implied acquittal of a death sentence.' 2 The jury in Bullington,
however, was permitted by law to sentence the defendant to life imprison-
ment even if it found that the prosecution had proven the existence of the
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.' 3 Therefore, the
Bullington jury's imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment did not
necessarily establish that the prosecution had failed to prove its case or that
the jury's verdict acquitted the defendant of the greater sentence."' Thus,
97. 451 U.S. at 445. The term "implied acquittal" is not used by the majority in reference
to its opinion. Rather, it is the dissent that refers to the majority's holding as applying the
"implicit-acquittal principle" of Green to sentencing. See id. at 448 (Powell, J., dissenting).
98. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
99. Id. at 370. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (death sentence overruled where
jury was composed only of jurors willing to render capital punishment rather than impartial
jurors); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (death sentence overruled where primary
witnesses for prosecution were deputy sheriffs who had custody of jurors thereby prejudicing
jury and rendering the jury invalid); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (conviction and death
sentence reversed and new trial ordered where jury was not impartial due to extensive media
coverage).
101. 451 U.S. at 440-41.
102. Id. at 443. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
103. 451 U.S. at 434-35.
104. In State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908 (Mo. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Bull-
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neither Burks nor Green was applicable to the facts in Bulington. Instead,
the Court should have focused on whether the policy underlying the double
jeopardy clause required intervention in the bifurcated procedure.
An analysis of the bifurcated trial procedure utilized in Bulington reveals
that it was consistent with double jeopardy policy. The double jeopardy
clause is designed to protect the defendant from undue harassment.' 5 The
presentence hearing, essential to a bifurcated trial, protects the defendant
from harassment in the sentencing process.' 6 For instance, this procedure
places an additional burden on the prosecution. In addition to the facts
necessary to prove guilt at the first stage of the bifurcated proceeding, the
prosecution must prove the existence of aggravating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt to obtain the imposition of the death sentence.' 7
Moreover, the rules regarding admissibility of evidence are more flexible in
a presentence hearing, thus allowing a jury to hear mitigating evidence that
it normally would not ,hear in a trial on guilt." 8 In short, the bifurcated
procedure makes it more difficult for the prosecution to obtain imposition
ington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981), the Missouri Supreme Court, in upholding the state's
right to seek the death penalty on retrial, rejected the argument that by not imposing life im-
prisonment the first jury necessarily concluded that there were no aggravating circumstances.
The Missouri court based its rejection on the test formulated in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436
(1970), which incorporated the doctrine of collateral estoppel in the double jeopardy clause.
For purposes of collateral estoppel, the Ashe Court held that to determine whether an issue of
ultimate fact was necessary to a jury's verdict, a court is required to infer from the record of
the prior proceedings whether a reasonable jury could have based its verdict on some other
issue. Id. at 444. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court reasoned that a rational jury could
have based its imposition of life imprisonment upon several factors other than a finding of no
aggravating circumstances. For example, such a ruling may have been based upon a
defendant's plea for mercy. 594 S.W.2d at 913. In addition, the court noted that juries need
not sentence a defendant to death if they conclude that mitigating circumstances outweigh
the aggravating ones. Id. Finally, the Missouri Supreme Court stated that. even if the mitigating
facts did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, a jury had full discretion in sentencing.
Id.
105. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
106. The majority in Bullington stated that the use of the separate sentencing hearing acts as
a procedural safeguard for the defendant. 451 U.S. at 433. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 191-92 (1976) (bifurcated system is likely to remove deficiencies in the capital senten-
cing system including admissibility of evidence in a single hearing which is prejudicial to ques-
tion of guilt, but relevant to issue of sentence); Lane v. Maryland Penitentiary, 320 F.2d 179,
186 (4th Cir. 1963) (use of separate proceeding to resentence habitual offender is preferable
practice to unitary procedure because evidence of defendant's prior convictions will not bias
jury's decision as to guilt); Bifurcated Trial, supra note 17, at 631 (bifurcated proceeding is ad-
vantageous because it permits the introduction of all evidence critical to enlightened determina-
tion of punishment and it avoids the possibility of prejudice on the issue of guilt that exists
in unitary trials); Two Steps, supra note 17, at 135-36 (bifurcated hearings are preferable
because they permit sentencing jury to hear evidence regarding appropriate sentence that would
be excluded in unitary trials).
107. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 37. See also Virginia, supra note 36, at 997 (two-trial process allows
presentation of evidence on issue of death penalty at presentence hearing only, thus preventing
jury from becoming prejudiced in determination on guilt).
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of the death sentence. These procedures adequately protect the defendant
from undue harassment.
Further, if the Bullington Court's inquiry had been properly limited to
whether the Missouri statute was consistent with the policy underlying double
jeopardy, it would have recognized that by providing for mandatory state
supreme court review, the Missouri capital murder statute indeed satisfies
double jeopardy policy.' 9 If the death penalty is recommended, the statute
compels the jury to designate in writing the aggravating circumstances that
the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt."10 As such, the
statute allows the Missouri Supreme Court to review a jury's reasons for
recommending a death sentence."' If evidence presented in the presentence
hearing does not support the sentence imposed by the jury, the reviewing
judge is required to overrule the death sentence and remand the case for
resentencing." 2 This procedure clearly affords the defendant sufficient pro-
tection from prosecutorial harassment and preserves the state's right to im-
pose just punishment, thereby satisfying double jeopardy policy.
A final criticism of the Court's decision involves its treatment of an indi-
vidual's right to appeal. Although opponents of harsher sentencing often
argue that the threat of a harsher sentence chills the defendant's right to ap-
peal, prior to Bullington, this concern had not been problematic for the
Court. Opponents of harsher sentencing contend that a convicted defendant
may be unwilling to appeal the conviction if a harsher sentence might be
imposed on retrial." 3 In consistently rejecting this objection,"' the Court
109. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
110. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.012.4 (1979).
111. See id. § 565.014.1.
112. Id. § 565.014.5(2). See also Sanders v. State, 338 So. 2d 473 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976)
(increased sentence on retrial for buying stolen property improper because record failed to
show any valid reason for increased sentence), qff'd on rehearing, 344 So. 2d 1243 (Ala. Crim.
App.), cert. denied, 344 So. 2d 1246 (Ala. 1977); Marshall v. State, 265 Ark. 302, 578 S.W.2d
32 (1979) (harsher sentence reduced to original sentence because record failed to demonstrate
factual data supporting harsher sentence); State v. Leonard, 39 Wis. 2d 461, 159 N.W.2d 577
(1968) (harsher sentence on retrial following conviction for forgery overruled because reasons
for harsher sentence not satisfactorily stated on record). Cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 726 (1969) (judge imposing harsher sentence on retrial must set forth reasons for do-
ing so to allow for review of constitutional legitimacy).
113. See, e.g., Note, Harsher Sentencing By Jury on Retrial Is Permissible: Chaffin v. Styn-
chcombe, 28 Sw. L.J. 469, 476 (1974) (possibility of harsher sentence chills right to appeal and
deters the defendant from seeking the errorless trial that he is entitled to). The basis for this
argument originated in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). In Jackson, the Court
invalidated the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)
(1976). Under this provision, only a jury could impose the death sentence. As such, the Court
held that the statute placed an impermissible burden on a defendant's fifth amendment right to
plead not guilty and on his sixth amendment right to a jury trial. 390 U.S. at 581-82.
114. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973). In Chaffin, the defendant argued
that the Jackson Court had interpreted the Constitution as prohibiting government im-
posed choices that discouraged the exercise of constitutional rights in the criminal process. 412
U.S. at 29-30. The Chaffin Court rejected the defendant's interpretation of the Jackson deci-
sion. Instead, the Chaffin Court relied on case law which upheld the validity of guilty pleas
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has reasoned that criminal law is replete with situations that require a
defendant to forfeit one right in order to gain another.'" The Court has
determined that this tension is constitutionally permissible as a legitimate at-
tendant to the retrial process." 6 Thus, the position taken by the Court in
Bullington seems inconsistent with precedent.
IMPACT
The Bullington Court extended double jeopardy protection to the sentenc-
ing portion of a bifurcated trial. This expansion results in different double
jeopardy treatment for defendants depending on whether they are tried in a
bifurcated" 7 or a single hearing. Consequently, under Bullington, a defen-
dant on retrial for a capital offense in a bifurcated proceeding will enjoy
double jeopardy protection of his original sentence. On the other hand,
under the Stroud, Pearce, and Chaffin decisions, a defendant charged with
a similar offense in a state that employs a single trial procedure will be
vulnerable to the death penalty on retrial, regardless of whether he initially
received a lesser sentence.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court must reevaluate its position on harsher re-
trial sentencing in capital offense cases involving single hearing proceedings.
made to avoid death sentences. 412 U.S. at 30. The justification underlying these decisions was
that such difficult choices were inevitable attributes of a legitimate system of plea bargaining.
See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (plea of guilty to second-degree murder
to avoid possible death sentence); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (plea of guilty
to kidnapping necessary to avoid possible death sentence under federal statutes); Parker v.
North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970) (plea of guilty to first-degree burglary to avoid potential
death sentence if convicted by jury after trial).
115. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971) (criminal process is replete
with situations which require defendant to make difficult choices); Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742 (1970) (plea bargaining is not in itself unconstitutional although it requires defendant
to make difficult choices).
116. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 35 (1973). See also Lernieux v. Robbins, 414
F.2d 353, 356 (1st Cir. 1969) (procedures chilling right to post-conviction review must be
tolerated if they support legitimate state interests and are reasonable); Johnson v. Com-
monwealth, 212 Va. 579, 585-86, 186 S.E.2d 53, 58 (1972) (possibility of harsher sentence
where state procedure afforded defendant opportunity to have second de novo trial before a
jury did not unconstitutionally chill right to appeal). But see Pendergrass v. Neil, 456 F.2d
469, 471 (6th Cir. 1972) (right to appeal cannot be impeded by threat of facing harsher
sentence); Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583, 585 (1st Cir. 1967) (harsher sentence in-
validated because possibility that defendant would face harsher sentence may chill right to ap-
peal).
117. The Constitution does not compel the states to use bifurcated hearings. McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 941 (1972). See also
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1976) (bifurcated trials are not constitutionally compelled even
though defendant in single hearing trial may not introduce evidence to mitigate sentence
without harming his case on guilt); Longberger v. Jago, 635 F.2d 1189 (6th Cir. 1980) (use of
single hearing trial does not violate fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination nor
sixth amendment right to jury trial); Nail v. Slayton, 353 F. Supp. 1013 (W.D. Va. 1972) (use
of single hearing trial does not violate constitutional right against self-incrimination).
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The basis. for this reevaluation should be Furman v. Georgia ' and subse-
quent cases which limit the sentencing authority's discretion.' 9 These cases
require that to impose the death sentence, the sentencing authority must
find that certain statutorily prescribed aggravating circumstances exist
beyond a reasonable doubt.' 20 This requirement was critical to the Bull-
ington Court's conclusion that the presentence hearing of a bifurcated trial
was procedurally similar to the determination of guilt in a single hearing
proceeding.' 2 ' Because of this similarity, the Bullington Court reasoned that
the double jeopardy protection afforded in trials on the issue of guilt
should be extended to the sentencing stage of the bifurcated trial. Because
post-Furman cases do not distinguish between bifurcated and single hearing
trials, but rather mandate that aggravating circumstances be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt in all capital offense trials, double jeopardy protection
should be extended to sentences issued by a jury in a single hearing trial.
Thus, a strong argument exists that when the issue of the harsher resentencing
in a single hearing confronts the Court again, it should overrule Stroud,
Chaffin, and subsequent cases that allow harsher sentences on retrial in the
single hearing context involving capital offenses. In the alternative, the Court
may choose to distinguish these cases because they were decided prior to Fur-
man and its progeny and, thus, did not require the additional finding by the
sentencing authority.' 2 Unless the Court chooses one of these alternatives,
defendants charged with capital crimes will have different double jeopardy
protection depending upon whether they are tried in bifurcated or single trial
proceedings.
Furthermore, the Bullington decision neutralizes the jury's role as a
sentencing authority on retrial in a bifurcated proceeding. The Bullington
Court has undermined the jury's function by removing the death sentence
from the jury's consideration when a prior jury had imposed a lesser
sentence. Double jeopardy protection, however, should not shield a defen-
dant from the punishment that his offense merits,' 23 but rather should prevent
118. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (capital punishment statute that re-
quired jury to find existence of at least one of ten prescribed aggravating circumstances beyond
a reasonable doubt was constitutional); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (statute requir-
ing judge to find that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances to impose
death sentence was constitutional); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (statute requiring jury
to find existence of prescribed aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt to impose
death sentence satisfied Furman requirements).
120. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
121. 451 U.S. at 438-39. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
122. The Furman Court did not hold that a finding of aggravating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt was a prerequisite to the imposition of capital punishment. See supra notes
33-34 and accompanying text. The Chaffin decision, which did not impose any sentencing
limitations upon the jury, was decided one year after Furman but pre-dated the cases that
asserted this rule. See note 120 supra.
123. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964) (society would pay a high price if
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the accused from being unduly harassed.' 2' Because the bifurcated proceeding
in Bullington adequately protected the defendant from harassment, 25 it was
not necessary to preclude a second jury from rendering a just punishment.
Further, under the Bullington decision, the sentence imposed on the retrial
of a capital offense will be limited to life imprisonment, regardless of the
circumstances surrounding the offense.' 2' Thus, in the retrial context of the
bifurcated proceeding, the second sentencing decision has become an ad-
ministrative rubber-stamp of the first.'27 The legislature, not the judiciary,
is the proper body to determine the offenses that warrant capital punish-
ment."2 8 By disregarding this legislative function, Bullington prevents the
jury from considering whether the death penalty is warranted in a capital
punishment case.
CONCLUSION
In Bullington v. Missouri, the United States Supreme Court extended the
protection of the double jeopardy clause to a bifurcated proceeding. In so
doing, the Court precluded the imposition of a harsher sentence upon the
retrial of a defendant whose previous conviction for the same crime had
been invalidated. Double jeopardy protection was extended because the
presentence hearing of the bifurcated trial bears the essential characteristics
of a trial on the issue of guilt. The Court reasoned that the imposition of
life imprisonment had impliedly acquitted the defendant of the death
sentence and, thus, barred imposition of capital punishment.
The Bullington Court's analysis, however, was flawed. The Bullingto
jury was invalid and could not impose a valid sentence. Moreover, the
Missouri statute permitted the jury to impose life imprisonment even if the
prosecution had proven the aggravating circumstances necessary to impose
capital punishment. The Court erred by not relying on established policy to
determine whether double jeopardy protection should be extended to
presentence hearings in bifurcated trials.
defendant was immune to punishment because of a defect serious enough to constitute reversi-
ble error). Cf Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 218-19 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(framers of Bill of Rights were aware of societal interest in vindication of criminal justice and,
therefore, set outer limits for the protection of those accused of crime).
124. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
126. In states that permit the jury to impose either life imprisonment or the death sentence
in a bifurcated trial, Bullington will limit the sentence on retrial to life imprisonment if the
prior jury had rejected the death sentence. Practically speaking, in this situation there will be
no need for a jury to impose the sentence and, thus, no need for a presentence hearing.
127. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 43 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (limiting
a jury as to sentences it may impose impairs its ability to determine the punishment a crime
merits).
128. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 418 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) (it is the
historic prerogative of the legislative branch to protect citizens by designating penalties for pro-
hibitable conduct). See also United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 142-43 (1980)
(upholding legislative authority to attack problem in criminal justice system).
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Because the double jeopardy extension is founded on an untenable
distinction between bifurcated and unitary trial procedures, defendants in
bifurcated trials involving possible capital punishment will have greater dou-
ble jeopardy protection against harsher sentences than will their counter-
parts in single hearing trials. The Court would have avoided this disparate
treatment if it had based its decision in Bullington on double jeopardy
policy rather than procedural distinctions. As a result, the Court will have
to redetermine the extent of double jeopardy protection in single hearing,
capital offense cases.
Bernard J. Toussaint
